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This dissertation examined the differential causal attributions of non-aggressive 
and aggressive individuals responding to incidents of subordinate success and failure.  
Participants (N = 407) were presented with 16 vignettes (eight describing subordinate 
success and eight describing subordinate failure) that utilized unique combinations of 
consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information.  Participants made attributions 
regarding the cause of the subordinate’s behavior (i.e., person, task, circumstances, or 
any combination of the three) and indicated their preferred behavioral response (i.e., 
praise/reward, reprimand/punish, coach/train, redesign the task, or do nothing).  When 
responding to incidents of subordinate success, the causal attributions of aggressive 
individuals were similar to those of non-aggressive individuals.  However, when 
responding to incidents of subordinate failure, in an apparent attempt to make the 
subordinate more worthy of hostility, the causal attributions of aggressive individuals 
deviated from those of non-aggressive individuals for two information patterns (i.e., low 
consensus, high distinctiveness, and high consistency; low consensus, low 
distinctiveness, and low consistency).  Moreover, for aggressive individuals, the 
processing of information relating to subordinate failure was considerably less complex 
than the processing of information relating to subordinate success.  Implications, 
potential limitations, and directions for future research are discussed. 
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When responding to subordinate performance, supervisors must first determine 
what behavior is most appropriate.  To do so accurately, they must have a clear 
understanding of what caused the subordinate’s performance.  Unfortunately, the nature 
of organizational work typically prevents supervisors from being able to directly 
observe most of their subordinates’ performance.  Thus, supervisors must often infer, 
via the process of induction, the cause of a subordinate’s performance based upon any 
available information (Ashkanasy, 1989; Green & Mitchell, 1979). 
Induction is the cognitive process by which a general conclusion is drawn from 
a set of specific premises (Mill, 1973; Mortimer, Graig, & Cohn, 1988).  Unlike 
deduction, in which general premises logically guarantee a specific conclusion, the 
specific premises of inductive reasoning merely provide probabilistic support for a 
conclusion; they cannot guarantee it (Copi, 1982).  Thus, in an attempt to understand 
and explain the causes of subordinate behavior, organizational leaders must often draw 
upon specific observable information, recognize patterns amongst these observations, 
and use these patterns to formulate a general conclusion regarding the cause of the 
subordinate’s performance (Green & Mitchell, 1979; Kelley, 1973).  Despite the fact 
that these conclusions only produce probabilistic support, given specific information 
patterns, individuals generally tend to form similar causal attributions for particular 
behaviors (cf., Hilton & Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983; McArthur, 1972; Mitchell & 
Wood, 1980; Orvis, Cunningham, & Kelley, 1975).  This consistency in leaders’ causal 
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attributions of subordinate performance (and the stability of subordinates’ reciprocal 
attributions) engenders greater trust and understanding in the performance evaluation 
process (Huber, Podsakoff, & Todor, 1986). 
Aggression, and its impact upon the processing of attribution information, is a 
possible threat to this stability.  Recent research into the nature of human aggression has 
identified a set of cognitive mechanisms that aggressive individuals utilize to enhance 
the rational appeal of aggressive behavior (James, 1998; James et al., 2005).  These 
justification mechanisms (JMs) bias the rational thought processes of aggressive 
individuals in an attempt to make the desired target of aggression appear more 
deserving of hostility.  Thus, when frustrated, threatened, or otherwise provoked, the 
rational thought processes of aggressive individuals are substantially different from 
those of non-aggressive individuals (James et al., 2004).  The purpose of this study is to 
examine the extent to which the JMs for aggression impact the processing of traditional 
attribution information.  Specifically, it compares the attributional patterns of aggressive 
and non-aggressive individuals when responding to instances of subordinate success 
and failure.  Moreover, it looks at the complexity of the processing of attribution 
information and the intended behaviors that follow. 
Causal Attribution 
 Research on causal attribution is typically grounded in the covariation principles 
introduced by Kelley (1973).  When inferring the cause of a subordinate’s performance 
on a particular task, three types of information, consensus (Cs), distinctiveness (Ds), 
and consistency (Cy), are used to infer whether the person (P), the task (T), the 
circumstances (C), or some interaction of these factors (PT, PC, TC, or PTC) produced 
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the given outcome (e.g., success or failure).  Consensus information relates the 
subordinate’s performance to the performance of others working on the same task.  
High consensus indicates that the subordinate’s performance was similar to the 
performance of others, whereas low consensus indicates that the subordinate’s 
performance was dissimilar to the performance of others.  Distinctiveness information 
relates the subordinate’s performance to his or her performance on similar tasks.  High 
distinctiveness indicates that the subordinate’s performance was dissimilar to his or her 
performance on other tasks, whereas low distinctiveness indicates that the subordinate’s 
performance was similar to his or her performance on other tasks.  Consistency 
information relates the subordinate’s performance to his or her performance on the same 
task in the past.  High consistency indicates that the subordinate’s current performance 
on the given task is similar to his or her past performance on the same task, whereas low 
consistency indicates that the subordinate’s current performance on the given task is 
dissimilar to his or her past performance on the same task.  The model proposed by 
Kelley, often referred to as the ANOVA model, suggests that individuals examine the 
covariation of these three information sources (e.g., low Cs, low Ds, and high Cy) and 
form subsequent attributions on the basis of these patterns (e.g., a P attribution). 
 The inductive logic model (ILM) of causal attributions (Jaspars, Hewstone, & 
Fincham, 1983) is a refinement of Kelley’s (1973) ANOVA model.  Like the Kelley 
model, the ILM proposes that the process of causal attribution is a function of the 
processing of consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information.  Moreover, as 
with the Kelley model, the ILM focuses upon causal attributions ascribed to the person, 
the task, the circumstances, or some interaction of the three.  However, unlike the 
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Kelley model which suggests that individuals analyze the covariation of the three 
information sources, the ILM proposes that the information sources are coded to 
indicate the necessary presence of the person, task, and circumstances for the 
production of the behavioral outcome.  Low consensus indicates that the person is 
necessary to produce the given outcome, high distinctiveness indicates that the task is 
necessary to produce the given outcome, and low consistency indicates that the 
circumstances are necessary to produce the given outcome.  Thus, for example, a 
combination of high consensus, high distinctiveness, and high consistency (HHH) 
information should theoretically lead to a task (T) attribution.  Similarly, a combination 
of low consensus, low distinctiveness, and low consistency (LLL) information should 
lead to a person x task combination (PT) attribution. 
The specific manner in which consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency 
information relate to causal attributions allows for the ILM to make specific predictions 
regarding which attributions will be made given specific information patterns.  In the 
low consensus, low distinctiveness, high consistency (LLH) information pattern, the 
ILM predicts that a P attribution will be made; for the HHH information pattern a T 
attribution is predicted; for the HLL information pattern, a C attribution is predicted; for 
the LHH information pattern, a PT attribution is predicted; for the LLL information 
pattern, a PC attribution is predicted; for the HHL information pattern, a TC attribution 
is predicted; for the LHL information pattern, a PTC attribution is predicted; and no 
prediction is made for the HLH information pattern due to the fact that none of the 
available information specifies a cause for behavior (Jaspars, 1983).  Research evidence 
has generally provided support for the predictions of the ILM (cf., Hewstone & Jaspars, 
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1987; Jaspars, 1983).  Moreover, a specific comparison of the two models has 
demonstrated the superiority of the ILM to the ANOVA model with regard to predictive 
ability (Hilton & Jaspars, 1987). 
Although the predictions of the ILM are generally supported, the reasoning 
theorized to drive these predictions is not.  If, as the ILM prescribes, consensus 
indicates the necessity the person, distinctiveness indicates the necessity of the task, and 
consistency indicates the necessity of the circumstances, then the data could simply be 
explained by modeling an interaction between consensus and person attributions (CsP), 
distinctiveness and task attributions (DsT), and consistency and circumstance 
attributions (CyC).  Thus, together the terms would be modeled as follows: 1
 [CsP][DsT][CyC]      (1) 
That is, consensus information (and only consensus information) influences the 
occurrence of a person attribution, distinctiveness information (and only distinctiveness 
information) influences the occurrence of a task attribution, and consistency 
information (and only consistency information) influences the occurrence of a 
circumstance attribution.  However, Iacobucci and McGill (1990) demonstrated that this 
simple model is insufficient for describing the processing of attribution information.  In 
their reanalysis of the Hilton and Jaspars (1987) data, they concluded that causal 
attributions are best represented by a much more complex model: 
[CsDsCyP][CsCyPC][DsCyPC][DsCyTC][CsT]   (2) 
They obtained similar results in their reanalysis of the Hewstone and Jaspars (1987) 
                                                 
1 The three-way interaction between the factors that serve as predictor variables must be included in all 
logistic regression models (Fienberg, 1977).  For clarity, it is not included in the following model. 
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data: 
[CsDsCyP][CsDsPT][DsCyTC]     (3) 
As well as in their reanalysis of the Jaspars (1983) data: 
[CsCyTC][CsCyPC][DsPC]      (4) 
This highlights an interesting inconsistency.  Despite the relative stability of the 
predictions of the ILM model, the theoretical reasoning underlying these predictions is 
unclear.  Nevertheless, what is clear is that the typical processing of attribution 
information is more complex than the explanation provided by the ILM. 
Leader Attributions 
The leader attribution model proposed by Green and Mitchell (1979) 
incorporates the basic principles of the Kelley (1973) ANOVA model (see Figure 1-1).  
Initially, the leader is presented with an incident of subordinate behavior (i.e., good or 
bad performance).  From this, the leader forms an attribution regarding the 
subordinate’s performance (i.e., he or she infers what caused the performance).  Finally, 
the leader must decide how to respond to the subordinate’s behavior based upon the 
causal attribution that was formed.  Additional factors moderate the linkages between 
these three components.  The first linkage (between the subordinate’s behavior and the 
leader’s causal attribution) is moderated by the traditional information patterns of 
consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency (proposed by Kelley, 1973).  The second 
linkage (between the leader’s causal attribution and his or her response) is moderated by 
the perceived impact of the subordinate’s performance.  In addition, bias stemming 
from sources such as impression management, dynamics of the leader-subordinate 




























Figure 1-1.  The Leader Attribution Model (Green & Mitchell, 1979) 
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Overall, empirical evidence has supported the primary linkages of the Green and 
Mitchell model (Ashkanasy, 1989; Hargrett, 1981; Mitchell & Wood, 1980).  
Additional studies have provided specific support for the first linkage (Mitchell, Green, 
& Wood, 1981) as well as the second linkage (Dobbins, Pence, Orban, & Sgro, 1983; 
Green & Liden, 1980; Knowlton & Mitchell, 1980).  Moreover, empirical evidence has 
provided support for the moderating influence of the supervisor’s perceived cost of the 
subordinate’s behavior (Mitchell & Kalb, 1981) as well as numerous other biasing 
factors such as gender (Dobbins, 1985), impression management (Wood & Mitchell, 
1981), interpersonal interactions (Gioia & Sims, 1986), leader experience (Mitchell & 
Kalb, 1982), leader-subordinate relationship (Fedor & Rowland, 1989; Heneman, 
Greenberger, & Anonyuo, 1989; Ilgen, Mitchell, & Fredrickson, 1981), subordinate 
likeableness (Dobbins & Russell, 1986), and subordinate self-handicapping (Crant & 
Bateman, 1993). 
Although there has been a substantial amount of research supporting the Green 
and Mitchell (1979) model, two areas have received little empirical attention.  First, the 
information factors from which leaders infer causality have been largely ignored.  
Leader attribution research utilizing the Green and Mitchell model typically focuses  
upon the specific information patterns believed to engender strong internal (i.e., P) or 
external (i.e., T or C) attributions.  For example, in an examination of leader responses 
to poor performance, Mitchell and Wood (1980) only used two of the eight possible 
information patterns to engender either a strong internal attribution (i.e., a P attribution 
via low Cs, low Ds, and high Cy) or a strong external attribution (i.e., a TC attribution 
via high Cs, high Ds, and low Cy).  Thus, while research has clarified our understanding 
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of leader responses following unambiguous internal and external attributions, there is 
little to no understanding of leader responses following mixed attributions (i.e., PT, PC, 
TC, or PTC). 
Second, while a substantial amount of research has focused upon numerous 
sources of bias in the Green and Mitchell model, biases stemming from particular leader 
traits (e.g., personality) have not been examined.  Although there is little research on 
this topic, what does exist suggests that particular individual differences can bias the 
inductive reasoning that occurs when making causal attributions.  For example, in an 
examination of intra-individual attributional processes, Tukey and Borgida (1983) 
concluded that individual differences had a greater influence upon causal attributions 
than the presented attribution information.  More specific studies have highlighted the 
relationship between personality characteristics such as self-consciousness and self-
esteem and biases in causal attribution (cf., Hirschy & Morris, 2002; Shaherwalla & 
Kanekar, 1991).  Similarly, research on aggression has highlighted the propensity for 
aggressive individuals to process social cues in a manner that deviates from traditional 
patterns (James, 1998; James & McIntyre, 2000; James et al., 2005; Zelli, Dodge, 
Lochman, Laird, & Conduct Problems Prevention Research Group [CPPRG], 1999).  
Thus, although largely ignored, recent empirical evidence suggests that personality 
traits, and aggression in particular, can significantly bias causal attributions.  
Aggression 
Aggressive individuals are unique in that they are motivated by the desire to 
inflict harm upon others (Baron & Richardson, 1994).  However, like most others, 
aggressive individuals are also motivated by the desire to view themselves in a 
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favorable light (James et al., 2004).  The presence of these two conflicting motives 
engenders an internal conflict within the aggressive individual.  In an effort to reduce 
this conflict, aggressive individuals utilize a set of implicit cognitive biases, referred to 
as justification mechanisms (JMs), which help to rationalize aggressive behavior by 
making the desired target of aggression appear more worthy of hostility (James, 1998).  
By making aggression appear to be the most logical course of action (i.e., the course of 
action that most others would take) the dissonance between the conflicting motives of 
aggression and favorable self-regard is mitigated, thus facilitating aggressive behavior.  
Five cognitive biases have been identified as JMs for aggression (James et al., 2005).  
Each of these JMs operates implicitly without any conscious awareness, yet each one 
contributes to the explicit rationalization of aggressive behavior. 
Hostile Attribution Bias.  The hostile attribution bias (HAB) is based upon the 
implicit assumption that other people are motivated by a desire to harm others (James et 
al., 2005).  This cognitive bias allows aggressive individuals to conclude that the actions 
of others are malevolent in nature and thus deserving of retaliation.  More specifically, 
“even benign or friendly acts may be credited to hidden, hostile agendas designed to 
inflict harm” (James et al., 2005, p. 7).  Thus, by attributing malevolent intent to the 
behaviors of others, aggressive individuals are able to rationalize their own aggressive 
behavior as an act of self-defense. 
Potency Bias.  The potency bias (PB) is based upon the implicit assumption that 
social interactions are actually contests by which one establishes dominance and respect 
(James, 1998).  This cognitive bias allows aggressive individuals to conclude that 
aggression is actually a method by which one rightfully demonstrates supremacy.  In 
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contrast, a lack of aggression is concluded to be a demonstration of inferiority.  By 
framing social interactions in this manner, aggressive individuals rationalize aggressive 
behavior as an “act of strength or bravery that gains respect from others” and the 
decision not to act aggressively “is to invite powerful others to take advantage of you” 
(James et al., 2005, p. 74). 
Retribution Bias.  The retribution bias (RB) is based upon the implicit 
assumption that retaliation is more important than maintaining social relationships 
(James, 1998).  This cognitive bias allows aggressive individuals to conclude that 
retaliation is superior to reconciliation.  Thus, aggressive behavior is rationalized as an 
acceptable method of restoring respect and authority.  Moreover, retaliation is 
considered to be more reasonable than forgiveness.  As described by James et al. 
(2005), “this bias often underlies justifications for aggression engendered by wounded 
pride, challenged self-esteem, and perceived disrespect” (p. 7). 
Social Discounting Bias.  The social discounting bias (SDB) is based upon the 
implicit assumption that social customs are restrictive to free will and the satisfaction of 
needs (James, 1998).  This cognitive bias allows aggressive individuals to forego 
traditional ideals and social standards in favor of norm-breaking aggressive behavior.  
Often, aggressive individuals focus their observations upon the more cynical and critical 
aspects of a given situation.  Moreover, “reasoning [is] further [evidenced by] a lack of 
sensitivity, empathy, and concern for social customs, often accompanied by the absence 
of rational prohibitions against behaving in socially unorthodox ways” (James et al., 
2005, p. 7).  By framing social customs as restrictive and unnecessary, aggressive 
individuals can rationalize hostile behavior as providing an acceptable avenue of self 
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expression. 
Victimization by Powerful Others Bias.  The victimization by powerful others 
bias (VPOB) is based upon the assumption that those with power seek to oppress those 
without power (James, 1998).  This cognitive bias allows aggressive individuals to 
regard themselves as victims of those who they perceive as more powerful.  Moreover, 
“framing of events, hypotheses about cause and effect, and confirmatory searches for 
evidence both engender and reinforce inferences that people are being victimized by 
powerful others” (James et al., 2005, p. 7).  By framing themselves as victims of 
oppression, aggressive individuals are able to rationalize hostile behaviors as acceptable 
and necessary responses. 
Aggression and Attributions 
The goal of the present study is threefold.  First, the present study seeks to 
compare the attributional response patterns of aggressive and non-aggressive 
individuals.  By biasing inductive processes, the JMs for aggression help to shape the 
reasoning of aggressive individuals by enhancing the rational appeal of aggressive 
behavior (James, 1988; James et al., 2005).  However, aggressive individuals do not 
continually engage in outwardly hostile behavior.  Typically, a triggering event or 
behavior, although often subtle, is necessary to incite aggressive behavior (e.g., Miller, 
Pedersen, Earlywine, & Pollock, 2003; Tremblay & Belchevski, 2004; Vasquez, 
Denson, Pedersen, Stenstrom, & Miller, 2005).  Triggers such as threats to self-image 
(Fein & Spencer, 1997) and threatened egoism (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998) have 
been shown to be especially prone to evoke aggressive behavior.  Thus, when 
evaluating subordinate success (performance that should not be viewed as threatening to 
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the image and/or standing of a supervisor), the attributions of both non-aggressive and 
aggressive individuals should be consistent with those predicted by the ILM. 
Hypothesis 1:  When assessing the cause of successful subordinate performance, 
non-aggressive individuals will form attributions that follow the predictions of 
the ILM. 
Hypothesis 2:  When assessing the cause of successful subordinate performance, 
aggressive individuals will form attributions that follow the predictions of the 
ILM. 
Similarly, when evaluating subordinate failure, the attributions of non-aggressive 
individuals should be consistent with those predicted by the ILM. 
Hypothesis 3:  When assessing the cause of subordinate failure, non-aggressive 
individuals will form attributions that follow the predictions of the ILM. 
However, when aggressive individuals evaluate subordinate failure (performance that 
could be viewed as threatening to the image and standing of a supervisor), their 
attributions should differ substantially from the predictions of the ILM.  Specifically, 
aggressive individuals should make substantially more P attributions in an attempt to 
make the subordinate appear more worthy of aggression. 
Hypothesis 4:  When assessing the cause of subordinate failure, aggressive 
individuals will form P attributions regardless of the presented information. 
A second aim of the present study is to examine the extent to which the 
cognitive biases for aggression impact the processing of attribution information.  
Iacobucci and McGill (1990) noted that although the predictions of the ILM were 
largely accurate, the relationship between relevant attribution information (Cs, Ds, and 
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Cy) and subsequent attributions (P, T, C, PT, PC, and PTC) was far more complex.  
Overall, Iacobucci and McGill concluded that a complex model that included 
polynomial interactions (i.e., [CsDsCyP][CsCyPC][DsCyPC][DsCyTC][CsT]) provided 
the best fit for previously published attribution data (i.e., Hilton & Jaspars, 1987).  
Thus, it is expected that non-aggressive individuals (those who do not utilize the JMs 
for aggression in their cognitive processing) will demonstrate a similarly complex 
process of attribution information in their evaluations of subordinate success and 
subordinate failure.  That is, for non-aggressive individuals, there should be no 
substantial difference in the complexity of the cognitive processing of attribution 
information between their evaluations of subordinate success and their evaluations of 
subordinate failure. 
Hypothesis 5:  For non-aggressive individuals, there will be no substantial 
difference in the number of significant terms between their evaluations of 
subordinate success and their evaluations of subordinate failure. 
In contrast, when feeling threatened, aggressive individuals rely (at least in part) on the 
JMs for aggression.  These JMs alter the cognitive processing of aggressive individuals.  
Essentially, they supplant traditional attribution information in an attempt to make the 
target of aggression more deserving of hostility.  Thus, when responding to instances of 
subordinate failure, aggressive individuals should display a substantially less complex 
level of attribution information processing than they utilize when evaluating subordinate 
success.   
Hypothesis 6:  For aggressive individuals, there will be fewer significant terms 
used when evaluating subordinate failure relative to evaluations of subordinate 
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success. 
Finally, the present study seeks to compare the intended behavioral responses of 
aggressive and non-aggressive individuals following attributions of success and failure.  
When determining what course of action to take in response to successful subordinate 
performance, both non-aggressive and aggressive individuals should advocate non-
punitive responses (i.e., responses that are not hostile in nature such as praise/reward).  
Hypothesis 7:  When responding to incidents of subordinate success, non-
aggressive individuals will advocate non-punitive behavioral responses. 
Hypothesis 8:  When responding to incidents of subordinate success, aggressive 
individuals will advocate non-punitive behavioral responses. 
Similarly, when determining what course of action to take in response to subordinate 
failure, non-aggressive individuals should advocate non-punitive responses. 
Hypothesis 9:  When responding to incidents of subordinate failure, non-
aggressive individuals will advocate non-punitive behavioral responses. 
However, when aggressive individuals are determining what action to take in response 
to subordinate failure, they should advocate aggressing towards the subordinate. 
Hypothesis 10:  When responding to incidents of subordinate failure, aggressive 
individuals will advocate punitive behavioral responses. 
In sum, when evaluating subordinate success, it is expected that the attributions 
and subsequent behavioral responses of aggressive individuals will be similar to those 
of non-aggressive individuals.  Alternately, when evaluating subordinate failure, it is 
expected that the attributions and subsequent behavioral responses of aggressive 
individuals will be substantially different than those of non-aggressive individuals.  
16 
Aggressive individuals should disregard the provided attribution information and 
advocate a person attribution and subsequent punishment.  Moreover, when compared 
to their evaluations of successful subordinate performance, aggressive individuals 
should demonstrate a substantial decrease in the complexity of their cognitive 






The sample consisted of 407 participants who were recruited from an 
introductory management course at a large public university.  Of those reporting 
demographic information2, ages ranged from 19 to 39 years (M = 21.27, SD = 2.30) 
with 54% being male and 91% being Caucasian.  In exchange for their participation, 
students received extra credit towards their course grade. 
Measures 
Attributions.  A 16-item attribution measure was specifically developed for use 
in this study.  Each of the 16 items reported the occurrence of a subordinate’s behavior 
followed by three statements representing one of the eight possible combinations of 
consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information.  Eight items described the 
occurrence of a successful work-related behavior and eight of the items described the 
occurrence of an unsuccessful work-related behavior.  A subject matter expert (SME) 
assisted in the development of each of the 16 subordinate behaviors that were modeled 
after typical behaviors performed by front-line workers in an automotive assembly 
plant.  Moreover, in an attempt to control for an increase in person attributions that can 
occur when the outcomes of behavior have severe consequences (Mitchell & Wood, 
1980), the SME provided judgments regarding the severity of the outcomes of the work 
behaviors and those with comparable severity were selected for use in this study. 
                                                 
2 95% of participants provided their demographic information. 
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Items were constructed using the following format.  For the success condition 
(e.g., While working on the assembly line today, John installed door latches correctly.), 
consensus information was presented as follows: 
(1) Almost all of John’s coworkers installed door latches correctly.  (High 
consensus) 
(2) Almost none of John’s coworkers installed door latches correctly.  (Low 
consensus) 
Distinctiveness information was presented as follows: 
(1) However, John installed trunk latches incorrectly.  (High distinctiveness) 
(2) John also installed trunk latches correctly.  (Low distinctiveness) 
Consistency information was presented as follows: 
(1) In the past, John has installed door latches correctly.  (High consistency) 
(2) In the past, John has installed door latches incorrectly.  (Low consistency) 
For the failure condition (e.g., John installed door latches incorrectly), consensus 
information was presented as follows: 
(1) Almost all of John’s coworkers installed door latches incorrectly.  (High 
consensus) 
(2) Almost none of John’s coworkers installed door latches incorrectly.  (Low 
consensus) 
Distinctiveness information was presented as follows: 
(1) However, John installed trunk latches correctly.  (High distinctiveness)  
(2) John also installed trunk latches incorrectly.  (Low distinctiveness) 
Consistency information was presented as follows: 
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(1) In the past, John has installed door latches incorrectly.  (High consistency) 
(2) In the past, John has installed door latches correctly.  (Low consistency) 
Following the presentation of the information pattern, respondents were asked to 
indicate what they believed to be the cause of the subordinate’s behavior via the 
following question: 
Given this information, what caused John to correctly install the door latches? 
As suggested by Jaspars (1983), all seven of the possible causal explanations for the 
occurrence of the behavior were presented: (1) the person, (2) the task, (3) the 
circumstances, (4) the person and the task, (5) the person and the circumstances, (6) the 
task and the circumstances, or (7) the person, the task, and the circumstances.  
Moreover, each of the causal explanations included information specific to the item.  
Thus, following the example above, respondents were provided with the following 
response choices: 
(1) the Person (John) 
(2) the Task (installing trunk latches) 
(3) the Circumstances (luck) 
(4) the Person and the Task (John and installing trunk latches) 
(5) the Person and the Circumstances (John and luck) 
(6) the Task and the Circumstances (installing trunk latches and luck) 
(7) the Person, the Task, and the Circumstances (John, installing trunk latches, 
and luck)  
Following the causal attribution, respondents were asked to indicate what action they 
would take in response to the subordinate’s performance via the following question: 
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What action would you take in response to John’s performance? 
Respondents were then presented with five possible responses that were modeled after 




(4) redesign task 
(5) do nothing 
A sample item is shown in its entirety in Figure 2-1. 
To enhance the evocative nature of the measure in an attempt to ensure that the 
aggressive participants viewed the situation as threatening (Bushman & Baumeister, 
1998), the following written instructions for completing the questionnaire were 
presented: 
As a manager you are likely to find yourself directly responsible for the 
performance of multiple individuals.  You will be responsible for their successes and their 
failures.  Thus, it is important that you understand the causes of their successes and their 





□ the Circumstances (luck)
□ the Person and the Task (John and installing door latches)
□ the Person and the Circumstances (John and luck)
□ the Task and the Circumstances (installing door latches and luck)
□ the Person, the Task, and the Circumstances (John, installing door latches, and luck)









While working on the production line today, John installed door latches correctly.  Almost 
none of John’s coworkers installed door latches correctly.  John also installed door locks 
correctly.  In the past, John has installed door latches correctly.
the Task (installing door latches)






Figure 2-1.  A Sample Attribution Item. 
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from always being able to directly observe the daily performance of your subordinates.  
Many times you will have to infer the causes of their success and failures from other 
information that is available. 
For this questionnaire, you are to assume the role of a manager of an automotive 
assembly plant where you are directly responsible for the performance of multiple 
employees.  For 16 of these employees, you will be presented with a series of statements 
regarding their individual performance and the performance of others.  Your task is to 
decide, on the basis of the information given, what caused your employee to perform in 
the way he did.  You must choose among one of seven possible causes and indicate your 
choice by checking the box next to the cause which you think is correct.  After deciding 
what caused the behavior, you must decide what action you, as manager, will take. 
Following these instructions, the sample item from Figure 2-1 was presented.  Finally, 
following the sample item, the following reminder was presented: 
Please remember, as the supervisor of these individuals, it is important that you 
make the correct decision about the cause of their performance and take the 
appropriate action. 
Aggression.  The 25-item Conditional Reasoning Test of Aggression (CRT-A) 
was used to measure individual aggression.  The CRT-A uses inductive reasoning 
problems to assess individual tendencies for using JMs to enhance the rational appeal of 
aggression (James & McIntyre, 2000).  Each item consists of a stem and four responses.  
The stem presents a set of specific premises from which a general conclusion must be 
drawn.  Responses consist of one logical aggressive response, one logical non-
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aggressive response, and two illogical responses.  For example, Figure 2-2 presents an 
illustrative conditional reasoning problem. 
In this problem, respondents are presented with a set of statements regarding the 
past quality of American cars and are asked to draw a logical conclusion.  Aggressive 
individuals, particularly those utilizing the Hostile Attribution Bias and Victimization 
by Powerful Others Bias, are expected to identify Alternative D as being the most 
logically feasible option.  While aggressive individuals may accept the logical 
plausibility of Alternative C, they should find Alternative D to be more logically 
attractive in that it provides greater insight into the motives of automobile 
manufactures.  In contrast, non-aggressive individuals are expected to identify 
Alternative C as being the most logically feasible solution.  While non-aggressive 
individuals may accept the logical plausibility of Alternative D, they should find 
Alternative C to be more logically attractive in that it lacks the cynicism and malice of 
Alternative D.  Alternatives A and B are illogical responses and included to enhance the 
face validity of the problem. 
Following test manual instructions (James & McIntyre, 2000), each aggressive 
response is scored +1 towards a total aggression score while each non-aggressive 
response is scored as +0 towards the total aggression score.  Individuals receiving an 
overall aggression score of eight or more are considered to possess a strong implicit 
readiness to aggress and are classified as being aggressive.  Individuals with an overall 
aggression score of less than eight are classified as being non-aggressive.  In addition, 






The Japanese knew more about building good cars 15 years ago.
American car makers built cars to wear out 15 years ago so they could 
make more money.
American cars have gotten better in the last 15 years.  American car makers 
started to build better cars when they began to lose business to the Japanese.  
Many American buyers thought that foreign cars were better made.
Which of the following is the most logical conclusion based on the above?
America was the world’s largest producer of airplanes 15 years ago.
Swedish car makers lost business in America 15 years ago.
 
Figure 2-2.  A Sample CRT-A Item 
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protocol described in the CRT-A test manual, individuals with an overall illogical score 
greater than or equal to five are not considered to have completed the measure earnestly 
and are removed from the analyses.3
Procedure 
Data were collected on three separate occasions during the academic semester 
(i.e., 15 weeks).  Following an in-class examination, students were presented with the 
opportunity to participate in the study for extra credit.  The CRT-A was administered 
following the first exam, the attribution measure was administered following the second 
exam, and the demographic information was collected following the final exam. 
Analyses 
 Attribution responses were aggregated into an 8 x 7 contingency table.  Each of 
the eight rows represented one of the eight possible combinations of high and low 
consensus, distinctiveness, and consistency information (i.e., HLH, LLH, HHH, HLL, 
LHH, LLL, HHL, and LHL).  Each of the seven columns represented one of the 
possible attributions that can be made by participants (i.e., P, T, C, PT, PC, TC, and 
PTC).  Thus, each table entry represented the number of participants who made the 
corresponding column attribution on the basis of the information pattern presented in 
each row. 
Traditional attribution studies have utilized relatively simple analytic procedures 
with responses to each information pattern (e.g., LLH) being analyzed separately.  The 
predicted attribution for a particular information pattern is tested by examining whether 
                                                 
3A total of 61 participants were removed from an initial sample of 468 because they provided more than 4 
illogical responses on the CRT-A. 
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it is significant (e.g., Does the LLH information pattern lead to a significantly greater 
number of person attributions?) and whether the non-predicted attributions are non-
significant.  This is often achieved by comparing the frequency of the predicted 
attribution (e.g., P for the LLH pattern) with the aggregate of the remaining attributions 
(i.e., P, T, C, PC, TC, and PTC).  This method is effective in most cases; however, it 
becomes problematic when there is no significant difference between the aggregated 
values (Feinberg, 1977).  Nevertheless, overall, these types of procedures are adequate; 
however, they do not utilize all of the information that exists in the 23 factorial structure 
that represents the information patterns and the potential responses (Iacobucci & 
McGill, 1990). 
To avoid this shortcoming, subgroup responses were examined simultaneously.  
First, individual scores on the CRT-A were examined and participants were classified as 
either aggressive or non-aggressive.  Following this classification, the attribution data 
for subordinate success and subordinate failure were examined separately for both the 
aggressive and non-aggressive groups (i.e., four 8 x 7 contingency tables were 
examined that represented the data from the non-aggressive group responding to 
employee success, the aggressive group responding to subordinate success, the non-
aggressive group responding to subordinate failure, and the aggressive group 
responding to subordinate failure).  The analytical method used to examine the 
attribution data followed the model presented by Iacobucci and McGill (1990).  To test 
Hypotheses 1 through 4, the model of independence was fitted to each of the 8 x 7 
contingency tables.  The standardized residuals were then examined to determine which 
attributions were occurring significantly more than would be expected by chance alone.  
27 
Thus, for example, if the P attribution in the HLH condition had a standardized residual 
of 2.47, it would indicate that the number of P attributions was significantly greater (p < 
.01) than would be expected by chance alone. 
To test Hypotheses 5 and 6, a series of log linear models were fitted to the data.  
To do this, two constraints were necessary (Iacobucci and McGill, 1990).  First, a set of 
structural zeros were added to the attribution data to complete the 23 structure of the 
attributions.  When the data is reshaped in this manner, there are a total of 62 possible 
effects: 6 main effects, 15 two-way interactions, 20 three-way interactions, 15 four-way 
interactions, and 6 five-way interactions.  Second, each model had to include the three-
way interaction of CsDsCy.  This is due to the fact that log linear models require the 
inclusion of the highest interaction between the independent variables (Lloyd, 1999).  
Thus, with Cs, Ds, and Cy being treated as the independent variables and the P, T, and 
C dimensions being treated as the dependent variables, the CsDsCy term was included 
in every model. 
With these two constraints, the effects were modeled in turn, starting with the 
simplest and moving to the most complex.  Model I contained the CsDsCy interaction 
and the main effects (i.e., P, T, and C); model II contained all of the two-way 
interactions (e.g., CsP); and model III contained all of the three-way interactions.  To 
test the significance of each of the individual interaction effects, nested models were 
tested.  Each of the nested models represented the full model minus one of the 
interaction terms.4  This allowed the significance of each removed effect to be tested.  
For example, model IIa contained all of the effects of model II except for the CsP effect.  
                                                 
4 The testing of the four-way effect utilized model III with the addition of the four-way effect to be tested. 
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Comparing the fit of models II and IIa tests the significance of the CsP effect.  If model 
II does not provide a significantly better fit than model IIa, then the CsP effect is not 
significant and does not help to explain the data.  Conversely, if model II is a 
significantly better fit than model IIa, then the CsP effect is significant and helps to 
explain the data.  This process was used to test a total of 49 effects.5  However, because 
of the sheer number of effects that were tested, a more conservative p-value of .01 was 
utilized.  Once a model was found that fit the data, the parameter estimates were 
examined to determine the nature of the interactions. 
The method for analyzing behavioral intentions, Hypotheses 7 through 10, 
followed the same process used to analyze Hypotheses 1 through 4.  The data was 
organized into a 7 x 5 contingency table.  Each of the seven rows represented one of the 
seven possible attributions than could be made by participants (i.e., P, T, C, PT, PC, TC, 
and PTC) and each of the 5 columns represented one of the five possible behavioral 
responses that participants could advocate.  Thus, each table entry represented the 
number of participants who endorsed the column behavior given the row attribution.  
The model of independence was fitted to the 7 x 5 contingency table for each of the four 
possible groups (i.e., the non-aggressive group responding to subordinate success, the 
aggressive group responding to subordinate success, the non-aggressive group 
responding to subordinate failure, and the aggressive group responding to subordinate 
failure).  The standardized residuals were then examined to determine which behavioral 
intentions were endorsed significantly more often than would be expected by chance 
                                                 
5 Insufficient degrees of freedom precluded testing of the five- and six-way effects. 
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The results are presented in four sections.  The first section describes the 
classification of aggressive individuals via the CRT-A.  The second section addresses 
Hypotheses 1 through 4 via examination of the standardized residuals produced when 
fitting the data to the model of independence.  The third section addresses Hypotheses 5 
and 6 and details the log linear models examining the cognitive processing of attribution 
information.  The final section addresses Hypotheses 7 through 10 via examination of 
the standardized residuals produced when fitting the data to the model of independence. 
Aggressive Classification 
 Of the 407 study participants, the CRT-A identified 44 as being aggressive 
(11%).  This is consistent with empirical research suggesting that 8% to 12% of the 
population is aggressive (James & McIntyre, 2000; James et al., 2005).  Correlational 
analyses indicated that the classification of aggression was unrelated to age (r = .018, 
ns) and there was no significant difference between the aggression scores of different 
ethnic groups, F(4, 380) = 1.251, ns.  Moreover, the internal consistency of the CRT-A 
was acceptable (K-R 20 = .77). 
Analysis of Attributions 
Subordinate Success.  The attributions for subordinate success were first 
examined for the non-aggressive group (see Table 3-1).  For each of the seven 
information patterns for which the ILM predicts an attribution, the predicted attribution  
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Table 3-1.  Standardized Residuals for Attributions of Subordinate Success 
CsDsCy
Non-aggressive (n = 363)
HLH 4.35 1.59 -3.99 4.09 -1.94 -5.35 0.19
LLH 17.55 -4.53 -3.99 -0.72 -4.58 -2.84 -1.30
HHH -4.22 16.39 -4.73 -1.57 -3.88 -2.28 -1.49
HLL -4.22 -1.34 10.29 -4.33 0.69 2.18 -2.41
LHH -3.81 -4.91 -1.93 10.83 -2.36 3.58 -3.53
LLL -0.54 -3.89 -2.96 0.00 12.06 -3.12 -1.86
HHL -3.81 -1.59 3.22 -4.82 -0.14 9.57 -1.67
LHL -5.31 -1.72 4.10 -3.49 0.14 -1.73 12.07
Aggressive (n = 44)
HLH 0.88 0.53 -1.98 2.35 0.30 -1.98 -0.44
LLH 5.41 -1.41 -0.73 0.61 -1.70 -0.51 -1.97
HHH -2.01 6.75 -1.98 -0.09 -2.10 -0.51 -0.44
HLL -1.90 -2.19 5.53 -1.83 -0.90 0.97 0.57
LHH 0.05 -1.41 -0.73 3.39 -1.70 0.60 -0.95
LLL 0.05 -1.80 -1.15 -0.09 5.50 -1.61 -0.95
HHL -0.77 0.15 0.10 -2.87 -0.10 3.54 0.06
LHL -2.01 -0.63 0.94 -1.48 0.70 -0.51 4.13
Note.   Cs = Consensus; Ds = Distinctiveness; Cy = Consistency; H = High; L = Low; P = Person; T = Task; C = 
Circumstances; PT = Person x Task; PC = Person x Circumstances; TC = Task x Circumstances; PTC = Person x 
Task x Circumstances.  The attributions predicted by the inductive logic model are in bold.  Attributions that were 
endorsed significantly more than would be expected by chance (p  < .05) are underlined.
Attributions
P T C PT PC TC PTC
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was the largest standardized residual.  When non-aggressive participants were presented 
with the LLH information pattern, they made significantly more P attributions than 
would be expected by chance alone (z = 17.55, p < .001); when presented with the HHH 
information pattern, they made significantly more T attributions (z = 16.39, p < .001); 
when presented with the HLL information pattern, they made significantly more C 
attributions (z = 10.29, p < .001); when presented with the LHH information pattern, 
they made significantly more PT attributions (z = 10.83, p < .001); when presented with 
the LLL information pattern, they made significantly more PC attributions (z = 12.06, p 
< .001); when presented with the HHL information pattern, they made significantly 
more TC attributions (z = 9.57, p < .001); and when presented with the LHL 
information pattern, they made significantly more PTC attributions (z = 12.07, p < 
.001).  Several additional unpredicted attributions were also significant.  When non-
aggressive participants were presented with the HLL information pattern, they made 
significantly more TC attributions than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.18, p 
< .05); when presented with the LHH information pattern, they made significantly more 
TC attributions (z = 3.58, p < .001); when presented with the HHL information pattern, 
they made significantly more C attributions (z = 3.22, p < .01); and when presented with 
the LHL information pattern, they made significantly more C attributions (z = 4.10, p < 
.001).  Additionally, for the HLH information pattern, for which the ILM makes no 
prediction, non-aggressive participants made significantly more P attributions (z = 4.35, 
p < .001) and PT attributions (z = 4.09, p < .001), than would be expected by chance 
alone.  Thus, overall, Hypothesis 1 is supported.  When making attributions for 
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subordinate success, the attributions of non-aggressive individuals follow the 
predictions of the ILM. 
The attributions of the aggressive group followed a similar pattern.  When 
aggressive participants were presented with the LLH information pattern, they made 
significantly more P attributions than would be expected by chance alone (z = 5.41, p < 
.001); when presented with the HHH information pattern, they made significantly more 
T attributions (z = 6.75, p < .001); when presented with the HLL information pattern, 
they made significantly more C attributions (z = 5.53, p < .001); when presented with 
the LHH information pattern, they made significantly more PT attributions (z = 3.39, p 
< .001); when presented with the LLL information pattern, they made significantly 
more PC attributions (z = 5.50, p < .001); when presented with the HHL information 
pattern, they made significantly more TC attributions (z = 3.54, p < .001); and when 
aggressive participants were presented with the LHL information pattern, they made 
significantly more PTC attributions than would be expected by chance alone (z = 4.13, p 
< .001).  Finally, for the HLH information pattern, for which the ILM makes no 
prediction, aggressive participants made significantly more PT attributions than would 
be expected by chance alone (z = 2.35, p < .01).  Thus, overall, Hypothesis 2 is 
supported.  When making attributions for subordinate success, the attributions of 
aggressive individuals follow the predictions of the ILM. 
Subordinate Failure.  The attributions for subordinate failure were first 
examined for the non-aggressive group (see Table 3-2).  As with the attributions for 
subordinate success, for each of the seven information patterns for which the ILM 
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Table 3-2.  Standardized Residuals for Attributions of Subordinate Failure 
CsDsCy
Non-aggressive (n = 363)
HLH 1.16 0.10 -3.81 6.94 -1.16 -2.51 -2.83
LLH 14.32 -3.44 -4.53 0.83 -4.23 -0.35 -3.18
HHH -5.36 16.09 -0.37 -3.66 -3.12 -2.18 -1.76
HLL -4.53 -2.39 8.81 -4.40 2.46 1.58 0.53
LHH -0.62 -2.91 -3.81 10.43 -2.28 -0.55 -1.76
LLL -0.02 -4.35 -1.81 -1.66 10.56 -2.35 -0.35
HHL -5.15 1.11 4.17 -5.31 -2.17 9.86 0.68
LHL 0.21 -4.22 1.35 -3.16 -0.05 -0.38 8.67
Aggressive (n = 44)
HLH -0.74 1.10 -0.73 2.23 -1.02 -1.06 0.43
LLH 2.76 0.17 -1.56 -0.15 -1.02 0.15 -2.03
HHH -1.82 3.89 -1.15 2.23 -1.02 -1.06 -0.06
HLL -2.09 -0.29 3.44 -1.73 1.70 0.15 -0.06
LHH 1.69 -1.69 -1.15 0.64 -0.63 -0.45 0.43
LLL 1.96 -1.22 0.10 -0.54 0.92 -1.66 -1.54
HHL -1.28 -0.29 0.94 -2.13 1.31 3.77 -0.55
LHL -0.47 -1.69 0.10 -0.54 -0.24 0.15 3.39
PT
Note.   Cs = Consensus; Ds = Distinctiveness; Cy = Consistency; H = High; L = Low; P = Person; T = Task; C = 
Circumstances; PT = Person x Task; PC = Person x Circumstances; TC = Task x Circumstances; PTC = Person x 
Task x Circumstances.  The attributions predicted by the inductive logic model are in bold.  Attributions that were 







predicts an attribution, the predicted attribution was the largest standardized residual.  
When non-aggressive individuals were presented with the LLH information pattern, 
they made significantly more P attributions (z = 14.32, p < .001); when presented with 
the HHH information pattern, they made significantly more T attributions (z = 16.09, p 
< .001); when presented with the HLL information pattern, they made significantly 
more C attributions (z = 8.81, p < .001); when presented with the LHH information 
pattern, they made significantly more PT attributions (z = 10.43, p < .001); when 
presented with the LLL information pattern, they made significantly more PC 
attributions (z = 10.56, p < .001); when presented with the HHL information pattern, 
they made significantly more TC attributions (z = 9.86, p < .001); and when presented 
with the LHL information pattern, they made significantly more PTC attributions (z = 
8.67, p < .001).  Several additional unpredicted attributions were also significant.  When 
non-aggressive participants were presented with the HLL information pattern, they 
made significantly more PC attributions than would be expected by chance alone (z = 
2.46, p < .01); and when presented with the HHL information pattern, they made 
significantly more C attributions (z = 4.17, p < .001).  Finally, for the HLH information 
pattern, for which the ILM makes no prediction, non-aggressive participants made 
significantly more PT attributions than would be expected by chance alone (z = 6.94, p 
< .001).  Thus, overall, Hypothesis 3 is supported.  When making attributions for 
subordinate failure, the attributions of non-aggressive individuals follow the predictions 
of the ILM. 
In contrast, the attributions of the aggressive group followed a slightly different 
pattern.  As with the non-aggressive group, when aggressive participants were presented 
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with the LLH information pattern, they made significantly more P attributions than 
would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.76, p < .01); when presented with the HHH 
information pattern, they made significantly more T attributions (z = 3.89, p < .001) and 
significantly more PT attributions (z = 2.23, p < .01); when presented with the HLL 
information pattern, they made significantly more C attributions (z = 3.44, p < .001) and 
significantly more PC attributions (z = 1.70, p < .05); when presented with the HHL 
information pattern, they made significantly more TC attributions (z = 3.77, p < .001); 
and when presented with the LHL information pattern, they made significantly more 
PTC attributions (z = 3.39, p < .001).  Additionally, for the HLH information patter, for 
which the ILM makes no prediction, aggressive individuals made more PT attributions 
than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.23, p < .05).  However, unlike the non-
aggressive group, when aggressive participants were presented with the LHH 
information pattern, they made significantly more P attributions (rather than PT 
attributions) than would be expected by chance alone (z = 1.69, p < .05).  Moreover, 
when aggressive participants were presented with the LLL information pattern, they 
made significantly more P attributions (z = 1.96, p < .05). which contrasted with the PC 
attributions made by non-aggressive individuals.  Thus, overall, Hypothesis 4 is 
partially supported.  When making attributions for subordinate failure, aggressive 
individuals made P attributions for three of the eight information patterns, two of which 
deviated from the predictions of the ILM. 
Summary.  When evaluating subordinate success, the attributions of non-
aggressive and aggressive individuals did not differ from the predictions of the ILM.  
For each of the seven information patterns for which the ILM makes a prediction, the 
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predicted attribution was the largest standardized residual for both non-aggressive and 
aggressive individuals.  In contrast, when evaluating subordinate success, only the 
attributions of non-aggressive individuals held to the predictions of the ILM.  The 
attributions of aggressive individuals deviated from the predictions of the ILM for two 
information patterns.  Specifically, aggressive individuals made significantly more P 
attributions, and not the prescribed PT and PC attributions, for the LHH and LLL 
information patterns. 
Analysis of Cognitive Processing 
Non-Aggressive Individuals.  The significant effects for the attributions of non-
aggressive participants evaluating subordinate success and subordinate failure are 
displayed in Table 3-3.  For the success condition, 24 effects were significant.  The 
significant CsP, DsT, and CyC effects are consistent with the ILM.  However, the 
additional significant effects (i.e., 7 four-way interactions and 7 three-way interactions) 
suggest that the processing of attribution is much more complex.  Similarly, for the 
failure condition, 20 effects were significant.  As with the success condition, the 
significant CsP, DsT, and CyC effects are consistent with the ILM.  However, the 
additional significant effects (i.e., 8 four-way interactions and 5 three-way interactions) 
again suggest that the processing of attribution is somewhat more complex.  Moreover, 
although there is a decrease in the total number of significant effects from evaluations  
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Table 3-3.  Models and Fit Statistics for Non-Aggressive Individuals  
Model df df
I. CsDsCy P T C 1449.71 45 1168.63 45
II.
485.84 33 253.46 33
IIa. CsP 663.91 34 178.07 ** 479.56 34 226.10 **
IIb. CsT 487.46 34 1.62 267.10 34 13.64 **
IIc. CsC 491.81 34 5.97 * 258.47 34 5.01
IId. DsP 523.05 34 37.21 ** 310.12 34 56.66 **
IIe. DsT 630.41 34 144.57 ** 334.75 34 81.29 **
IIf. DsC 521.33 34 35.49 ** 261.51 34 8.05
IIg. CyP 493.34 34 7.50 * 257.11 34 3.65
IIh. CyT 489.49 34 3.65 257.50 34 4.04 *
IIi. CyC 810.26 34 324.42 ** 598.63 34 345.17 **
IIj. PT 510.56 34 24.72 ** 253.51 34 .05
IIk. PC 516.26 34 30.42 ** 254.56 34 1.10
IIl. TC 550.07 34 64.23 ** 264.80 34 11.34 **
III.
342.29 14 158.95 14
IIIa. CsDsP 342.72 15 .43 179.95 15 21.00 **
IIIb. CsDsT 349.46 15 7.17 * 164.58 15 5.63
IIIc. CsDsC 354.65 15 12.36 ** 161.89 15 2.94
IIId. CsCyP 359.05 15 16.76 ** 164.52 15 5.57
IIIe. CsCyT 350.73 15 8.44 * 159.03 15 .08
IIIf. CsCyC 348.57 15 6.28 158.96 15 .01
IIIg. CsPT 342.98 15 .69 159.92 15 .97
IIIh. CsPC 357.53 15 15.24 ** 172.91 15 13.96 **
IIIi. CsTC 342.44 15 .15 160.32 15 1.37
IIIj. DsCyP 351.97 15 9.68 * 162.00 15 3.05
IIIk. DsCyT 342.67 15 .38 161.36 15 2.41
IIIl. DsCyC 344.21 15 1.92 167.97 15 9.02 *
IIIm. DsPT 343.93 15 1.64 164.57 15 5.62
IIIn. DsPC 342.39 15 .10 165.24 15 6.29
IIIo. DsTC 344.77 15 2.48 166.44 15 7.49 *
IIIp. CyPT 342.83 15 .54 160.27 15 1.32
IIIq. CyPC 346.07 15 3.78 162.04 15 3.09
IIIr. CyTC 349.29 15 7.00 * 166.13 15 7.18 *
IIIs. PTC 342.29 15 .00 158.95 15 .00
IVa. CsDsCyP 309.18 13 33.11 ** 140.68 13 18.27 **
IVb. CsDsCyT 341.64 13 .65 147.89 13 11.06 **
IVc. CsDsCyC 341.98 13 .31 158.74 13 .21
IVd. CsDsPT 264.37 13 77.92 ** 124.97 13 33.98 **
IVe. CsDsPC 328.87 13 13.42 ** 132.10 13 26.85 **
IVf. CsDsTC 324.40 13 17.89 ** 156.30 13 2.65
IVg. CsCyPT 341.88 13 .41 158.94 13 .01
IVh. CsCyPC 218.80 13 123.49 ** 134.87 13 24.08 **
IVi. CsCyTC 312.94 13 29.35 ** 146.82 13 12.13 **
IVj. CsPTC 342.29 13 .00 158.95 13 .00
IVk. DsCyPT 342.02 13 .27 156.52 13 2.43
IVl. DsCyPC 342.18 13 .11 147.96 13 10.99 **
IVm. DsCyTC 297.33 13 44.96 ** 111.67 13 47.28 **
IVn. DsPTC 342.29 13 .00 158.95 13 .00
IVo. CyPTC 342.29 13 .00 158.95 13 .00
For the following models, Model III was fitted without the noted term.
Success Condition Failure Condition
For the following models, Model III was fitted with the noted term added.
Note.  ΔG 2 tests are approximately distributed chi-squares with a single degree of freedom.  Cs = Consensus; Ds = Distinctiveness; 
Cy = Consistency; P = Person; T = Task; C = Circumstances.
* p  < .01.  ** p  < .001.
ΔG 2G 2 G 2 ΔG 2
CsDsCy CsP CsT CsC DsP DsT DsC CyP 
CyT CyC PT PC TC
For the following models, Model II was fitted without the noted term.
CsDsCy CsDsP CsDsT CsDsC CsCyP CsCyT 
CsCyC CsPT CsPC CsTC DsCyP DsCyT 




of success to evaluations of failure (24 to 20; a 16% decrease), this decrease stems from 
fewer significant two-way interactions (10 to 7) and three-way interactions (7 to 5) with 
an increase in the number of significant four-way interactions (7 to 8).  Thus, 
Hypothesis 5 is supported.  For non-aggressive individuals, there is no substantial 
change in the complexity of the processing of attribution information between 
evaluations of subordinate success and evaluations of subordinate failure. 
Aggressive Individuals.  The significant effects for the attributions of aggressive 
individuals evaluating subordinate success and subordinate failure are displayed in 
Table 3-4.  Like the non-aggressive group, the CsP, DsT, and CyC effects were 
significant.  Moreover, there were two significant three-way interactions and four 
significant four-way interactions.  In contrast, for the failure condition, the aggressive 
group only demonstrated five significant effects.  Like the non-aggressive group, the 
CsP, DsT, and CyC effects were significant.  However, only one three-way effect was 
significant (CsDsC) and no four-way effects were significant.  Moreover, this decrease 
in the total number of significant effects (10 to 5; 50%) stems from the loss of 1 three-
way interaction (2 to 1) and the loss of 4 four-way interactions.  Thus, Hypothesis 6 is 
supported.  For aggressive individuals, there is a substantial decrease in the complexity 
of the processing of attribution information between evaluations of subordinate success 
and evaluations of subordinate failure. 
Parameter Estimates.  The parameter estimates for each of the four models are 
listed in Table 3-5.  Interestingly, regardless of the group or the condition, overall, the 
parameter estimates are virtually indistinguishable from one another.  Only three 
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Table 3-4.  Models and Fit Statistics for Aggressive Individuals  
Model df df
I. CsDsCy P T C 239.94 45 130.38 45
II.
86.57 33 51.59 33
IIa. CsP 107.65 34 21.08 ** 62.08 34 10.49 *
IIb. CsT 89.30 34 2.73 57.20 34 5.61
IIc. CsC 86.66 34 .09 54.76 34 3.17
IId. DsP 93.15 34 6.58 52.21 34 .62
IIe. DsT 108.65 34 22.08 ** 59.33 34 7.74 *
IIf. DsC 87.15 34 .58 54.60 34 3.01
IIg. CyP 86.57 34 .00 52.70 34 1.11
IIh. CyT 88.77 34 2.20 58.45 34 6.86 *
IIi. CyC 146.55 34 59.98 ** 78.80 34 27.21 **
IIj. PT 88.81 34 2.24 52.69 34 1.10
IIk. PC 93.97 34 7.40 * 52.24 34 .65
IIl. TC 91.19 34 4.62 53.42 34 1.83
III.
52.60 14 25.19 14
IIIa. CsDsP 53.54 15 .94 28.40 15 3.21
IIIb. CsDsT 53.06 15 .46 26.39 15 1.20
IIIc. CsDsC 55.39 15 2.79 31.83 15 6.64 *
IIId. CsCyP 62.99 15 10.39 * 28.09 15 2.90
IIIe. CsCyT 57.41 15 4.81 28.99 15 3.80
IIIf. CsCyC 53.06 15 .46 25.70 15 .51
IIIg. CsPT 53.27 15 .67 25.23 15 .04
IIIh. CsPC 62.22 15 9.62 * 26.75 15 1.56
IIIi. CsTC 55.78 15 3.18 25.88 15 .69
IIIj. DsCyP 52.67 15 .07 25.19 15 .00
IIIk. DsCyT 54.29 15 1.69 25.37 15 .18
IIIl. DsCyC 52.62 15 .02 25.26 15 .07
IIIm. DsPT 53.35 15 .75 25.19 15 .00
IIIn. DsPC 56.99 15 4.39 25.20 15 .01
IIIo. DsTC 54.94 15 2.34 26.61 15 1.42
IIIp. CyPT 54.23 15 1.63 25.27 15 .08
IIIq. CyPC 56.32 15 3.72 25.22 15 .03
IIIr. CyTC 53.30 15 .70 25.52 15 .33
IIIs. PTC 52.60 15 .00 25.19 15 .00
IVa. CsDsCyP 42.56 13 10.04 * 23.25 13 1.94
IVb. CsDsCyT 51.66 13 .94 23.70 13 1.49
IVc. CsDsCyC 52.62 13 -.02 25.19 13 .00
IVd. CsDsPT 35.74 13 16.86 ** 20.10 13 5.09
IVe. CsDsPC 50.76 13 1.84 23.16 13 2.03
IVf. CsDsTC 50.83 13 1.77 24.29 13 .90
IVg. CsCyPT 52.12 13 .48 19.61 13 5.58
IVh. CsCyPC 33.28 13 19.32 ** 25.15 13 .04
IVi. CsCyTC 41.82 13 10.78 * 22.98 13 2.21
IVj. CsPTC 52.59 13 .01 25.19 13 .00
IVk. DsCyPT 49.32 13 3.28 24.36 13 .83
IVl. DsCyPC 51.51 13 1.09 24.32 13 .87
IVm. DsCyTC 51.26 13 1.34 22.60 13 2.59
IVn. DsPTC 52.58 13 .02 25.18 13 .01
IVo. CyPTC 52.58 13 .02 25.20 13 -.01
* p  < .01.  ** p  < .001.
For the following models, Model II was fitted without the noted term.
CsDsCy CsDsP CsDsT CsDsC CsCyP CsCyT 
CsCyC CsPT CsPC CsTC DsCyP DsCyT 
DsCyC DsPT DsPC DsTC CyPT CyPC CyTC 
PTC
For the following models, Model III was fitted without the noted term.
For the following models, Model III was fitted with the noted term added.
CsDsCy CsP CsT CsC DsP DsT DsC CyP 
CyT CyC PT PC TC
Note.  ΔG 2 tests are approximately distributed chi-squares with a single degree of freedom.  Cs = Consensus; Ds = Distinctiveness; 
Cy = Consistency; P = Person; T = Task; C = Circumstances.
Success Condition Failure Condition
G 2 ΔG 2 G 2 ΔG 2
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Table 3-5.  Parameter Estimates for Final Models 
Effect
CsP -.1806 a -.2589 a -.1740 a -.2350 a
DsP .0292
CyP -.0916
CsT -.1314 a -.1661 a
DsT .1803 a .0728 a .2158 a .1456 a
CyT .1575
CsC .0917
DsC .0726 a .1256 a
CyC -.3152 a -.3154 a -.4115 a -.3087 a
PT -.1820
PC -.1813 a -.2107 a
TC -.2517 a -.0913 b
CsDsP .1246
CsDsT .0674
CsDsC .0893 a .1098 a














CyTC -.0809 a .0605 b
PTC
CsDsCyP -.1152 a -.0799 a -.1397 a
CsDsCyT -.0619
CsDsCyC
CsDsPT -.1097 a -.0545 a -.1765 a
CsDsPC .0168 a .0708 a
CsDsTC .0690
CsCyPT
CsCyPC .2199 a .0858 b .2247 ab








Note.  abParamter estimates with different superscripts are significantly different from one 
another, p  < .05.  
1[CsDsCyP][CsDsPT][CsDsPC][CsDsTC][CsCyPC][CsCyTC][DsCyTC]    
2[CsDsCyP][CsDsCyT][CsDsPT][CsDsPC][CsCyPC][CsCyTC][DsCyPC][DsCyTC] 







effects, TC, CyTC, and CsCyPC, demonstrate significantly different parameter 
estimates across groups and conditions.  Of these three, only one, CyTC, displays 
parameter estimates with different signs.  However, this change is between non-
aggressive individuals in their assessment of success and failure.  The rest of the 
parameter estimates, regardless of the group (non-aggressive or aggressive) or the 
condition (success or failure) are all in the same direction with similar magnitudes. 
Summary.  In the processing of attribution information, non-aggressive 
individuals demonstrated no substantial difference in the complexity of their processing 
of attribution information for subordinate success and subordinate failure.  However, 
aggressive individuals demonstrated a substantially less complex level of attribution 
information processing when evaluating subordinate failure in comparison to their 
evaluations of subordinate success.  Additionally, despite the difference between the 
number and complexity of significant effects, the parameter estimates for the significant 
effects were, for the most part, statistically indifferent from one another.  Thus, even 
though aggressive individuals were no longer utilizing numerous sources of 
information, they did not compensate for this reduction with greater reliance upon the 
effects that were being utilized. 
Analysis of Behavioral Intentions 
 Subordinate Success.  The behavioral intentions in response to subordinate 
success were first examined for the non-aggressive participants (see Table 3-6).  When 
non-aggressive participants made a P attribution, they endorsed praise/reward 
significantly more often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 7.82, p < .001).   
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Table 3-6.  Standardized Residuals for Intended Responses to Subordinate Success  
Attribution P/R R/P C/T RT N
Non-aggressive (n = 363)
P 7.82 0.87 -1.73 -1.08 -5.15
T -5.40 -1.47 7.93 -3.46 2.68
C -6.24 0.15 -1.53 -0.84 5.91
PT 2.51 -0.11 -4.34 1.48 -0.65
PC 4.22 0.59 0.71 -1.66 -3.07
TC -2.19 -0.76 -2.57 2.42 2.02
PTC -1.55 1.15 0.19 4.27 -1.90
Aggressive (n = 44)
P 2.12 0.44 -1.71 -1.06 -0.31
T -1.43 -1.29 -1.27 -0.47 1.76
C -1.08 -0.36 0.66 1.57 -0.20
PT 0.46 -0.04 1.91 -0.97 -0.45
PC 2.49 1.95 1.06 -0.76 -1.92
TC -2.87 -0.62 0.16 0.81 1.41
PTC 0.70 0.03 -1.39 1.26 -0.52
Intended Action
Note.   P = Person; T = Task; C = Circumstances; PT = Person x Task; PC = Person x 
Circumstances; TC = Task x Circumstances; PTC = Person x Task x Circumstances; P/R = 
Praise/Reward; R/P = Reprimand/Punish; C/T = Coach/Train; RT = Redesign Task; N = 
Nothing.  Behaviors that were endorsed significantly more than would be expected by 
chance (p  < .05) are underlined.  
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Following a T attribution, they endorsed coaching/training significantly more often than 
would be expected by chance alone (z = 7.93, p < .001).  Additionally, this attribution 
pattern led non-aggressive participants to endorse doing nothing significantly more 
often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.68, p < .01).  When non-aggressive 
participants made a C attribution, they endorsed doing nothing significantly more often 
than would be expected by chance alone (z = 5.91, p < .001).  When non-aggressive 
participants a made a PT attribution, they endorsed praise/reward significantly more 
often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.51, p < .01).  When non-aggressive 
participants made a PC attribution, they endorsed praise/reward significantly more often 
than would be expected by chance alone (z = 4.22, p < .001).  When non-aggressive 
participants made a TC attribution, they endorsed redesigning the task significantly 
more often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.42, p < .01).  Additionally, 
this attribution pattern led non-aggressive participants to endorse doing nothing 
significantly more often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.02, p < .05).  
Finally, when non-aggressive participants made a PTC attribution, they endorsed 
redesigning the task significantly more often than would be expected by chance alone (z 
= 4.27, p < .001).  Thus, Hypothesis 7 is supported.  When responding to instances of 
subordinate success, non-aggressive participants endorsed non-punitive behaviors. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the behavioral intentions of the aggressive group did not 
strictly follow the pattern of the non-aggressive group when responding to instances of 
subordinate success.  As with the non-aggressive group, when aggressive participants 
made a P attribution, they endorsed praise/reward significantly more often than would 
be expected by chance alone (z = 2.12, p < .05).  When aggressive participants made a T 
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attribution, they endorse doing nothing significantly more than anything else (z = 1.76, 
p < .05).  However, when aggressive participants made a C attribution, no significant 
behavioral intention was evident.  When aggressive participants a made PT attribution, 
they endorsed coaching and training significantly more often than would be expected by 
chance alone (z = 1.91, p < .05).  When aggressive participants made a PC attribution, 
they endorsed praise/reward significantly more often than would be expected by chance 
alone (z = 2.49, p < .001).6  When aggressive participants made a TC attribution, no 
significant behavioral intention was evident.  Finally, when aggressive participants 
made a PTC attribution, no significant behavioral intention was evident.  Thus, 
Hypothesis 8 is supported.  When responding to instances of subordinate success, 
aggressive participants endorsed non-punitive responses. 
Subordinate Failure.  The behavioral intentions in response to subordinate 
failure were first examined for the non-aggressive participants (see Table 3-7).  When 
non-aggressive participants made a P attribution, they endorsed coaching/training 
significantly more often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 3.12, p < .01).  
When non-aggressive participants made a T attribution, they endorsed redesigning the 
task more often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 5.80, p < .001).  When  
                                                 
6 For the PT attribution, an additional significant effect existed for the intended action of 
reprimand/punish (z = 1.95, p < .05).  However, this is a spurious result based upon the extremely low 
occurrence of aggressive individuals advocating the reprimand/punish action.  Reprimand/punish was 
advocated by two individuals following a P attribution, no individuals following a T attribution, one 
individual following a C attribution, two individuals following a PT attribution, four individuals 
following a PC attribution, one individual following a TC attribution, and one individual following a PTC 
attribution.  Thus, although none of these frequencies are substantial, the four individuals advocating 
reprimand/punish were a sufficient enough deviation from the expected value (fe = 1.6) to make the 
frequency significantly different from random despite its small size. 
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Table 3-7.  Standardized Residuals for Intended Responses to Subordinate Failure 
Attribution P/R R/P C/T RT N
Non-aggressive (n = 363)
P -0.11 1.37 3.12 -6.08 1.17
T 1.41 -3.47 -0.55 5.80 -2.50
C 0.77 -2.20 -5.87 -4.06 10.76
PT 0.08 1.21 -0.52 5.00 -4.77
PC -1.00 1.81 4.28 -5.98 -0.02
TC -1.62 1.13 -2.22 8.10 -4.95
PTC 0.21 0.12 1.02 -2.01 0.54
Aggressive (n = 44)
P -0.92 4.58 -0.84 -1.52 -3.57
T -1.39 -2.41 0.45 0.88 2.56
C -0.09 -2.23 -0.24 0.17 2.63
PT 0.28 -0.09 0.68 1.45 -1.22
PC 0.90 0.12 0.25 0.61 -0.97
TC 0.91 -1.41 -0.17 0.45 1.11
PTC 1.01 -1.77 0.22 -1.40 2.32
Intended Action
Note.   P = Person; T = Task; C = Circumstances; PT = Person x Task; PC = Person x 
Circumstances; TC = Task x Circumstances; PTC = Person x Task x Circumstances; P/R = 
Praise/Reward; R/P = Reprimand/Punish; C/T = Coach/Train; RT = Redesign Task; N = 
Nothing.  Actions that were endorsed significantly more than would be expected by chance 
(p  < .05) are italicized.  
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non-aggressive participants made a C attribution, they endorsed doing nothing more 
often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 10.76, p < .001).  When non-
aggressive participants a made PT attribution, they endorsed redesigning the task more 
often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 5.00, p < .001).  When non-
aggressive participants made a PC attribution, they endorsed coaching/training more 
often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 4.28, p < .001).7  When non-
aggressive participants made a TC attribution, they endorsed redesigning the task more 
often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 8.10, p < .001).  Interestingly, when 
non-aggressive participants made a PTC attribution, no significant behavioral intention 
was evident.  Thus, in general, Hypothesis 9 is supported.  When responding to 
instances of subordinate failure, non-aggressive participants endorsed non-punitive 
behaviors. 
As with the success condition, the behavioral intentions of the aggressive group 
did not strictly follow the pattern of the non-aggressive group.  When aggressive 
participants made a P attribution, they endorsed reprimand/punishment significantly 
more often than would be expected by chance alone (z = 4.58, p < .001).  When 
aggressive participants made a T attribution, they endorsed doing nothing more often 
than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.56, p < .001).  Similarly, when 
aggressive participants made a C attribution, they endorsed doing nothing more often 
than would be expected by chance alone (z = 2.63, p < .001).  However, when 
aggressive participants made a PT attribution, a PC attribution, or a TC attribution, no 
                                                 
7 Similar to the previous note, the significant endorsement of reprimand/punish following a PC attribution 
is a statistical anomaly based upon the low occurrence of non-aggressive individuals advocating the 
reprimand/punish. 
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significant behavioral intention was evident.  Finally, when aggressive participants 
made a PTC attribution, they endorsed doing nothing more often than would be 
expected by chance alone (z = 2.32, p < .01).  Thus, Hypothesis 10 is partially 
supported.  When responding to instances of subordinate failure, aggressive participants 
endorsed reprimand and punishment only following a P attribution. 
Summary.  When determining what course of action to take in response to 
successful subordinate performance, both non-aggressive and aggressive individuals 
advocated non-hostile responses.  Similarly, when determining what course of action to 
take in response to subordinate failure, non-aggressive individuals advocated non-
punitive responses.  In contrast, aggressive individuals advocated a hostile response to 





In general, the results of this study provide substantial support for each of the 
proposed hypotheses.  When evaluating subordinate success, the attributions of 
aggressive individuals do not greatly differ from those of non-aggressive individuals.  
As with non-aggressive individuals, aggressive individuals follow the pattern predicted 
by the ILM.  Moreover, as aggressive individuals made the same attributions as non-
aggressive individuals, they generally endorsed similar prosocial responses.  Thus, 
aggressive individuals advocated praise and reward following both P and PC 
attributions.  However, among aggressive individuals, there was no clearly preferred 
behavioral response following the other four attributions. 
In contrast, when evaluating subordinate failure, the attributions of aggressive 
individuals differed from the non-aggressive group when responding to the LHH and 
LLL information patterns.  For these two patterns, aggressive individuals made clear P 
attributions instead of the predicted PT and PC attributions.  What makes this 
attributional shift most interesting is that it did not occur with the LHL information 
pattern.  As with the LHH and LLL information patterns, the LHL information pattern 
implies the necessity of a P effect (i.e., low Cs).  Yet aggressive individuals favored the 
PTC attribution over a strict P attribution.  Thus, it appears that the JMs for aggression 
have a limit to their cognitive impact.  While the JMs could effectively rationalize 
holding the subordinate accountable (and thus punishing him or her) for the conditions 
that engendered PT and PC attributions, they could not rationalize a shift from a PTC 
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attribution to a P attribution.  Of even greater interest is the decline in the number of 
significant effects from the success to the failure condition.  Aggressive individuals 
demonstrated half as many significant effects in the failure condition as they did in the 
success condition (10 significant effects in the success condition and only 5 significant 
effects in the failure condition).  This provides indirect evidence of the impact of JMs 
upon cognitive processes. 
 This calls into question the evocative nature of the stimuli.  A substantial 
amount of aggression research highlights the necessity of a trigger to arouse aggressive 
behavior.  If aggressive individuals are not provoked in some manner, the traditional 
belief is that they are not likely to act out.  The trigger utilized in this study was 
undeniably weak.  Yet it was potent enough to entice aggressive individuals to deviate 
from the standard attribution in two cases (LHH and LLL).  Thus, this pattern of results 
may reflect the way in which aggressive individuals view the nature of subordinate-
supervisor interactions rather than the way in which aggressive individuals respond 
when provoked.  This would be consistent with Potency Bias JM which leads 
aggressive individuals to view social interactions as contests of will and dominance. 
Implications 
 The most obvious implication of these findings, beyond the direct impact of 
excessive punishment, is the impact of aggressive supervisors upon subordinates’ 
perceptions of procedural fairness.  Procedural justice is a subordinate’s perception of 
the fairness of the procedures used in making decisions regarding his or her 
performance (Folger & Greenberg, 1985).  Thus, the methods by which decisions are 
made, not necessarily the outcomes themselves, are extremely important to employees.  
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Moreover, the correctness of the decisions regarding their performance is of critical 
importance (Sheppard, Lewicki, & Minton, 1992).  The importance of procedural 
justice was highlighted by Sashkin and Williams (1990).  They noted that organizations 
in which subordinates perceived their supervisors as being unfair evidenced higher 
levels of absenteeism and accident compensation costs.  The relevance of this trend to 
the present study’s findings is obvious.  The differential attribution of aggressive 
individuals in response to the LHH and LLL information patterns would, most likely, be 
perceived by subordinates as being incorrect and thus unfair.  Any subsequent 
punishment would be considered an egregious violation of procedural justice. 
Limitations 
 There are a number of limitations regarding the presented research.  First and 
foremost is the use of students as participants.  As they were all undergraduates with 
minimal work experience, much less supervisory experience, it is quite possible that 
these results have limited generalizability to actual supervisory assessment of 
subordinate performance.  While this may be the case, it should be noted that Fedor and 
Rowland (1989) concluded that “the longer supervisors are in their supervisory 
positions, the more they tend to perceive subordinates as having more control over their 
performance level” (p. 413).  That is, the more experience a supervisor has, the more 
likely he or she is to make a P attribution.  This suggests that aggressive supervisors 
could become more hostile towards unsuccessful subordinates the longer they are in a 
supervisory role (i.e., by making more P attributions which lead to retribution).  Thus, 
the results of this study may actually provide a more conservative glimpse of the impact 
of aggression on leader attributions.  Moreover, Anderson and Bushman (1997) note 
52 
that laboratory studies of aggression do in fact demonstrate substantial external validity.  
In fact, based on the results of their meta-analysis, they concluded that “all of the 
individual difference variables (sex, trait aggressiveness, Type A personality) and most 
of the situational variables (provocation, alcohol, media violence, anonymity) 
consistently influence aggressive behavior both inside and outside the laboratory” (p. 
35).  Thus, while the present study is no substitute for a field study, the results are 
nevertheless meaningful and certainly worthy of further examination.  
A second limitation regards the restricted response format of the attribution 
measure.  Participants were forced to attribute the cause of the subordinate’s behavior to 
one of the seven possible interactions of person, task, and circumstances.  Participants 
were not allowed to answer in a manner that indicated “none of the above, ” nor were 
they afforded the opportunity to seek additional information (see Gioia & Sims, 1986).  
Thus, some useful data was possibly lost.  Traditional attribution research has utilized 
this exact response format without much concern (cf., Hewston & Jaspars, 1987; Hilton 
& Jaspars, 1987; Jaspars, 1983).  Unfortunately, the use of log linear analyses 
necessitated the inclusion of structural zeros to complete the 23 contingency tables.  The 
degree to which this impacted the results is unclear.  However, Kimble and Seidel 
(1992) noted that people make causal attributions quite quickly and often prematurely 
(i.e., participants in their study made attributions even in the absence of complete 
information).  Thus, it is possible that the attribution measure used in this study did not 
force participants to make attributions; it may have simply forced them to report their 
attributions when they may have preferred to withhold them.  To avoid further concern, 
all eight possible response choices should be included in future research. 
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Third, the sample size of the aggressive group is problematic.  Unfortunately, as 
only 8% to 12% of individuals are aggressive (James et al., 2005), it is extremely 
difficult to obtain sufficient data on this population.  Moreover, the nature of the 
responses being frequency data severely limits statistical analysis.  However, some 
basic analyses can provide further support for the obtained results.  In particular, 
correlating the continuous aggression score with the total number of person attributions 
made when assessing subordinate success and subordinate failure yields correlations of 
-.028 (ns) and .27 (p < .01).  Thus, the more aggressive an individual is the more person 
attributions he or she is likely to make when assessing the cause of subordinate failure.  
Although this is a rather basic analysis, it nevertheless supports the general findings 
while also circumventing the issue of reduced sample size in the aggressive subset.  
Thus, while sample size may have impacted some of the results (e.g., when assessing 
subordinate success, the non-aggressive group displayed 24 significant effects while the 
aggressive group displayed only 10 significant effects), some of the most critical results 
were most likely unaffected (e.g., the aggressive group displayed 10 significant effects 
when assessing subordinate success and only 5 significant effects when assessing 
subordinate failure). 
Future Research 
 The results of this study highlight two critical areas that warrant further 
investigation.  The first relates to the nature of the JMs for aggression.  Whereas each of 
the JMs serves to rationalize aggressive behavior, they appear to do so in two distinct 
ways: reactive and proactive.  The Hostile Attribution Bias and the Retribution Bias are 
more reactive in the methods by which they rationalize aggressive behavior.  Both of 
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these JMs appear to require an external triggering stimulus, be it person-based or 
otherwise, for their activation (e.g., the Hostile Attribution Bias alters the perception of 
another’s behavior).  In contrast, the Potency Bias, Victimization by Powerful Others 
Bias, and Social Discounting Bias are much more proactive in their operation.  By 
definition, they alter the way in which aggressive individuals perceive the world (e.g., 
the Potency Bias leads aggressive individuals to view social interactions as contests for 
establishing dominance).  Thus, whereas the Hostile Attribution Bias may lead an 
aggressive individual to interpret a subordinate’s behavior as antagonistic, thus leading 
him or her to aggression against the subordinate, the Potency Bias may lead an 
aggressive individual to aggress against a subordinate without a particular triggering 
behavior.  Future research needs to distinguish the manner by which these JMs operate 
and clarify whether or not they lead to differential patterns of aggression. 
 A second area that necessitates future research is identifying the point in the 
cognitive process at which JMs actually bias reasoning.  From this study, it is apparent 
that the JMs for aggression do not alter information as it is initially observed.  If this 
were the case, aggressive individuals should have formed a P attribution following the 
LHL pattern.  As with the LHH and LLL information patterns, the LHL pattern implies 
a P effect via Cs information.  Moreover, the LHL and LHH patterns both indicate a T 
effect while the LHL and LLL patterns both indicate a C effect.  However, when 
responding to the LHL pattern, aggressive individuals obviously processed the Ds and 
Cy information in order to form the PTC attribution.  Yet, when responding to the LHH 
and LLL patterns, aggressive individuals discarded the information corresponding to T 
and C effects.  This suggests that the boundary for rationalizing aggressive behavior is 
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not based upon the difference between the observed information and the attribution, but 
rather it is based upon the difference between the “correct” attribution and the 
aggressive attribution. 
Conclusions 
The results of this study suggest that, when responding to incidents of 
subordinate success, aggressive individuals make causal attributions that are no 
different than those of non-aggressive individuals.  However, when responding to 
incidents of subordinate failure, given particular information patterns, aggressive 
individuals make substantially more person attributions than non-aggressive 
individuals.  Moreover, aggressive individuals follow the P attribution with an intention 
to retaliate against the subordinate.  This is in direct contrast to non-aggressive 
individuals who, when presented with similar information, make more appropriate 
attributions (e.g., PT instead of P) and intend to follow these attributions with more 
constructive behaviors (e.g., providing coaching/training following a PT attribution).  
More importantly, the results suggest that the JMs for aggression possess boundaries 
with regard to the amount of cognitive bias that they can produce.  Aggressive 
individuals only distorted the attributions of two of the seven information patterns (there 
was no need for aggressive individuals to distort the LLH attribution pattern which 
leads to a P attribution).  Thus, although the JMs for aggression are a powerful force in 
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